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Extension of martial law continues misery in Aceh 
In May 2003 the Jakarta authorities declared martial law in Aceh. The military top promised to 'deal 
with the GAM separatists once and for all. A few months later it was clear that the massive military 
operation was.failing or worse, was only preventing solution to the conflict. In November the cabinet 
in Jakarta agreed to extend martial law and the military top explicitly acknowledged that the large 
scale mopping up operations had failed to capture GAM leaders of any importance. 
In today's world it is difficult to find consensus on any 
matter of great importance but on the Aceh conflict every-
body agrees that a peaceful solution is preferable to a mili-
tary one. The 'international community', which includes 
Indonesia's major financial donors, agree that the on-going 
conflict should be resolved through dialogue which also 
means abandoning martial law in the most northerly part of 
Sumatra. Indonesia not only ignored this appeal but replied 
angrily 'saying it 'could be construed as meddling', accord-
ing to Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Marty Natalegawa. 
Three parties: the United States, European Union and Japan 
issued a statement urging Jakarta to work towards a politi-
cal solution and offered help in resolving the conflict. 
Natalegawa bluntly rejected the offer and replied: 'The 
humanitarian problem in Aceh cannot be resolved merely 
by foreign parties. The Indonesian government has enough 
resources and confidence to overcome the problem'. [AP, 7 
November 2003]. 
Already in mid October, the sixth month of the military 
operation in Aceh, Co-ordinating Minister for Political and 
Security Affairs ret'd General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
(SBY) gave a clear hint to the press that the Indonesian 
government intends to extend martial law· in Aceh. SBY 
who is in charge of the endorsement of martial law argued 
that the final goal of the military offensive was to restore 
security among the Acehnese people. Indonesia is to hold 
general elections on 5 April 2004 and SBY doubts whether 
the Acehnese would feel safe to exercise their political 
rights if the security situation remains unsafe. 
Another important issue that emerged from SBY's state-
ment is the sensitivity of the general elections. He acknowl-
edged that criticism has been made by NGOs and in parlia-
ment that elections held in Aceh under martial law are 
fundamentally flawed. Indonesian Military (TNI) 
Commander-in-Chief General Endriartono Sutarto has 
spoken of plans to maintain the 35,000 troops in Aceh "to 
make sure that all Acehnese people will be able to exercise 
their political rights" [Jakarta Post, l 5 October 2003]. 
Indonesian election watchers argue otherwise and say that 
flawed election results in Aceh will also affect the national 
elections negatively. They argue strongly to end martial law 
in Aceh. 
Rubber stamp 
The continuation of martial law was decided by the core 
cabinet and other institutions like DPR, the parliament, 
simply had to accept it. When the initial martial law was 
announced in May 2003 , it was enacted through 
Presidential Decree No. 28/2003 for six months with the 
promise that a proper evaluation would take place. 
Questions have been raised in parliament, requesting an 
evaluation but so far only skimpy information has been 
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provided to DPR by TNI. Many columnists in the 
Indonesian press have cautioned against the extension of 
martial law and argue that so far martial law has only 
created much suffering for the population of Aceh. 
Similar mistakes as in East Timor 
TNI Commander-in-Chief General Endriartono Sutarto 
has been quite honest about the failure to reach the objec-
tives of the military operation. TNI promised to obliterate 
GAM in six months. On 4 November the four star general 
told the press in Jakarta that the TNI forces have not been 
able to capture GAM leaders and stated that the continua-
tion of martial law was essential to chase and arrest the 
GAM leaders. [detik.com 4 Nov.2003]. He also said that 
the enactment of martial law was needed to ensure 
successful general elections in Aceh, a frank admission 
that the troops are not in control of the security situation. 
Ironically, while TNI's first man admits the failure of the 
military operation, at the same time the cabinet concluded 
that martial law should be extended. It becomes increas-
ingly clear who is in charge of the political agenda in 
Jakarta. On matters like the Aceh conflict it is the hard 
liners in the military who are calling the shots. 
The main responsible person is army chief of staff 
General Ryamizard Ryacudu. This four-star general is 
notoriously rude and blunt in appearance and in the present 
vacuum of political power at the top seems to be able to 
impose his will all the time. 
Nominally Commander in Chief Endriartono Sutarto is 
Ryacudu's superior but in the balance of power Ryacudu 
seems to have more support from the army rank and file. 
While Endriartono represents the wing in TNI that wants to 
modernise the armed forces (which often clashes with the 
illegal business activities of the military), Ryacudu repre-
sents the average officer who still remembers the elite posi-
tion of the army in the Suharto days. 
TNI's military strategy in Aceh pursues the same methods 
like the operations in East Timor in the eighties and 
nineties. In the first instance it was much more done on a 
massive scale pushing back the guerrillas to the mountains 
while driving the population into resettlement camps for 
isolation from the guerrilla force. In the second stage 
smaller units were despatched to hunt down the freedom 
fighters and gradually the population was recruited to 
become militia units or to attend in mass rallies to show 
their loyalty towards Jakarta. None of these strategies 
worked in East Timor and it is doubtful they will ever work 
in Aceh. 
TNI in the late seventies possessed much better equip-
ment. Arms sales from the west notably the US and UK 
gave TNI a positive balance against Falintil, the East 
Timorese armed wing. Nowadays TNA (Tentara Nasional 
Aceh, the armed wing of GAM), is often superior in their 
weaponry to the average TNI soldier. 
Hostility towards TNI is very clear among Acehnese 
villagers. From reports in the Indonesian press defiance 
from average Acehnese villagers is still clearly noticeable. 
The Indonesian military continuously use the argument that 
44 statements of Acehnese institutions have been made in 
favour of the extension of martial law but the East Timor 
experience has taught us that stage-managed loyalty expres-
sions don't mean much. 
Opting for a military solution 
Choosing for a military operation in Aceh has only 
increased the problems for authorities in Jakarta. Trea~i~g 
the conflict as a military problem and trying to resolve It m 
a military way has brought the Megawati government to a 
catch-22 situation. Abruptly withdrawing the 40,000 troops 
Martial law in Aceh means heavy military presence in the villages 
will mea:n a catastrophic defeat for Jakarta while continuing 
the military operation will only mean getting involved in an 
indefinite protracted and unpopular war. 
TNI went to Aceh with a clear objective to finish off the 
TNA. After six months operation and using 35,000 to 
40,000 troops, it is possible to make a cautious assessment. 
TNI troops indeed focussed on GAM strongholds, particu-
larly in East and North Aceh. 
The nature of the operation was a typical counter-insur-
gency operation. Two major thrusts were noticeable. TNI 
command troops went deep into the countryside to chase 
the TNA guerrilla forces while territorial troops were given 
the task to 'occupy' villages in the GAM areas. After several 
months operation, practically every village in the black 
areas (areas 'infected' by GAM) at least half a platoon of 
soldiers is stationed permanently. 
Official figures try to highlight an impressive performance 
by TNI. Almost 1,000 suspected members of GAM (more 
correctly TNA) have allegedly been killed in battle and 
more than 1,800 others have been arrested or surrendered. 
TNI also admits that 304 civilians lost their lives while 140 
others have been injured. Analysts are not impressed by the 
figures. The TNA is usually estimated as around 5,000 
strong, which means that TNA is far from decimated. The 
amount of weapons captured is also very low, which also 
means that the core of the TNA guerrillas have basically 
retreated to remote areas taking their equipment. 
The TNI forces have driven back the TNA guerrillas back 
to remote areas and by stationing soldiers in each village, 
TNI has also succeeded in create a 'distance' between the 
guerrillas and the villagers. This can be explained as a mili-
tary success for TNI. But if one probes further, this success 
is rather hollow. 
TNA as the military wing of GAM is definitely not 
defeated. The ultimate credo of guerrilla warfare: 'retreat if 
the enemy attacks and attack ifthe enemy is weak or unpre-
pared' is persistently practised by TNA. With the exception 
of a few relatively big skirmishes TNI was not able to have 
major confrontations with the TNA guerrillas. The few 
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conflicts occurred because the guerrillas had to defend and 
protect one of their senior leaders. 
Experts on GAM have assessed that so far TNA has not 
lost any of their key leaders. William Nessen, the US jour-
nalist who managed to join the TNA forces in the jungle 
say: 'The military reports almost 1000 GAM dead, but on 
closer look it's obvious that it hasn't gotten the right people. 
Only a couple of the top 100 or so commanders have been 
killed and none of the middle-level company commanders .. ' 
[Aceh Province, Behind the Lines, SMH 15 Nov.2003]. 
Key TNA persons like IshaK: Daud, Teuku Jamaica and 
Sofyan Daud can still be reached through their satellite 
phones and are still frequently interviewed by Indonesian 
journalists. 
New thrust of the military operation 
Major General Bambang Darmono, the operational 
commander of the military operation in Aceh has become 
the fall guy and has been replaced by Brig. General George 
Toisutta, formerly chief of staff of the Jakarta Military 
Command. Major General Bambang Darmono had a highly 
vocal and high profile appearance and on a few occasions 
expressed his ambitions to become the next territorial 
commander of Aceh. His position can be compared with the 
position of army commanders in East Timor during the 
eighties and nineties. 
The command structure in East Timor and likewise in 
Aceh was two pronged. The command structure was 
directly under the army HQ in Jakarta but at the same time 
the territorial structure remained in place. Clashes between 
Major General Endang Suwarya, the territorial commander 
and Bambang, the operational commander have been obvi-
ous. Analysts in Jakarta say that the decision to remove 
Bambang reflects the failure of TNI in Aceh.. Army Chief of 
Staff General Ryacudu mentions: "He (Bambang) is tired 
after having served in Nanggore Aceh Darussalam for so 
long" {Jakarta Post, 10 November 2003]. The real truth lies 
elsewhere. Bambang admitted on several occasions that his 
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boys were hunting but rarely hitting the core of GAM's 
military strength, according to William Nessen who had 
several encounters with the general. The battle in East 
Timor also terminated the career of many bright officers. 
Bambang Darmono's military career is temporarily shelved 
and it is doubtful whether he will occupy another pivotal 
position within TNI. 
Recent TNI reports mention a shift in the anti-guerrilla 
warfare. The new strategy relies on a combination of 
combat, intelligence and territorial operations. TNA has 
dispersed itself into smaller guerrilla units and will not get 
involved in direct combat. TNI is now retaliating and a new 
mobile strike unit has been established. This new unit can 
function as a small unit and can maintain a high degree of 
secrecy. This unit is meant to eliminate TNA and to cut off 
their logistics supply lines. This unit combines combat and 
intelligence operations. 
Another unit, according to General Endriartono Sutarto, 
is a skeleton unit with the task of securing populated areas, 
sterilising the villages, securing lines of logistics going to 
people and the military as well as digging for information 
and breaking down the enemy communications network, a 
combination of territorial and intelligence activities. 
The third unit is a combat unit, ''focused on destroying 
targets considered strategic, an enemy logistics store for 
example", said the general. [ source Media Indonesia, 12 
Nov. 2003, from BBC Worldwide Monitoring]. 
Major General Bambang Darmono represents the combat 
officer who is not needed anymore in this new stage of 
counter-insurgency and has been sent back to army HQ. 
Brig. General Toisutta, also an old East Timor hand has to 
apply the new strategy of involving and mobilising the 
Acehnese against GAM. A similar strategy was used in East 
Timor with disastrous results for the daily life of the 
villagers. Toisutta is seen as somebody with better social 
skills and is regarded as being able to apply 'the hearts and 
minds' strategy more effectively than his predeccesor. In the 
mid nineties Toisutta was the second in command in the 
regional military district of East Timor, the period that 
counter-insurgency methods were much more used in the 
cities in comparison with direct combat in the jungle. 
The recruitment of Acehnese civilians into militia groups 
has been enhanced strongly in particular in the so- called 
'black areas' like Bireuen, one of the GAM strongholds. The 
emergence of new groups like Berantas (People's Anti-
Separatist Front) and HBMB with close ties with the mili-
tary reflect a similar situation in East Timor of the mid-
nineties. It is the military intelligence recipe to create a 
condition of civil war in the region. 
The shaky foundation for peace 
The peace negotiations in Aceh occurred during the pres-
idency of Abdurrachman 'Gus Dur' Wahid, the first properly 
elected president in Indonesia. Gus Dur was a man of high 
principles and prior to his presidency he went as far as stat-
ing that holding a referendum for the political future of 
Aceh was a feasible option. But it became quickly clear that 
after his appointment in office, Gus Dur didn't want to go 
down in history as the one that caused the break-up of 
Indonesia by letting Aceh becoming independent. 
But he stuck to his non-violent ideals and the peace 
process under HDC (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue) 
became a reality in the 21 months Gus Dur was head of 
state. With all his good intentions to resolve the Aceh 
conflict through dialogue, the . political conditions in 
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Indonesia were far from ready. The mi litary were still bear-
ing a huge hang-up over the loss of East Timor while in 
Aceh itself a huge popular movement was emerging. Prior 
to and after the downfall of Suharto in 1998 and 1999 
hundreds of thousands of Acehnese rallied around the issue 
of a referendum for Aceh, justice and the ending of 
impunity. 
Military roadblocks everywhere 
While TNI was reaching its lowest point of unpopularity 
in the history of Indonesia, in several places, including in 
Aceh, the pro-democracy movement was demanding the 
arrest and trial of highly placed officers responsible for a 
series of massacres and other abuses in the past 30 years. In 
this climate of an Indonesian 'Prague Spring' it seemed that 
reformasi was really making giant steps ahead. As it turned 
out in reality the giant steps became dwarf steps. The Gus 
Dur's 21-month interregnum will go down in history as an 
ineffective and rather useless period with regard to democ-
ratic reform. The military and large sections of the bureau-
cracy resisted any meaningful change, sabotaging and 
obstructing the presidency to such an extent as to make Gus 
Dur incapable of governing. The people in Aceh hardly 
enjoyed the Indonesian 'Prague Spring'. TNI and the intelli-
gence services have always seen Aceh as a top security 
threat. 
The 'comeback' of TNI 
It took some time before TNI got its act together and 
managed to find a new foundation for its prominent role in 
society. The rather conservative political climate in 
Indonesia was actually quite conducive for a swift return of 
TNI to the centre of politics. It simply needed a new format 
and new justification. 
After the fall of Suharto a group of reform-minded offi-
cers emerged with advanced plans to make structural 
changes within TNI. The bottom line was to modernise the 
armed forces and to give it a clear back seat role in the 
democratic paradigm of civilian supremacy. Alas, this 
liberal wing was too small and too insignificant to create 
proper change within TNI. None of the liberal officers are 
now in pivotal posts, most have been replaced or ma~e 
redundant. Together with the impeachment of Gus Dur m 
July 2001 , the TNI made a spectacular. come~b.ack, estab-
lishing for itself a new place in Indonesian poht1cs. 
The new doctrine that has become the justification for the 
military to exert and impose their political will is called 
NKRI (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, Unitary State 
of the Republic of Indonesia). The coalition between 
Megawati and the military is based on this doctrine. For the 
sake of 'threats against the unity of the state', the military are 
allowed to take all necessary measures, including martial 
law and a massive military operation in Aceh. 
A comparison can be made with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the collapse of the Suharto regime. In both cases, 
during the post dictatorship period, regional, ethnic and reli-
gious conflicts flared up. In the Soviet Union, the milita~ 
played a minor political role and the country fell apart m 
different independent republics . This didn't occur in 
Indonesia and one of the major reasons is the pivotal role 
the military played. It is a public secret that hard-liners 
within the army used ethnic and religious conflicts to their 
political benefit. Those conflicts justified the on-going role 
of the military in society. Extreme elements on both sides of 
the conflict were fostered by the hardliners to the extent that 
atrocities were allowed to happen or were stage-managed 
using militia units as proxies. 
Aceh as a test case 
The conditions in Aceh were starkly different. TNI was 
never able to stage-manage events as it did in other places. 
The only answer to the upsurge of insurrection in Aceh was 
to launch brutal military operations. The vicious military 
operation from the Suharto period (1989-1998) was one 
example but it backfired massively. 
The Acehnese at large suffered greatly and animosity 
towards Jakarta grew enormously. GAM's popularity 
soared. It was in this period of TNI's weakest period that 
Acehnese civil society was able to organise mass demon-
strations peacefully in 1998 and 1999. 
But at the same time TNI remained vigilant in Aceh and 
even in this shaky period units were despatched and 
involved themselves in a new series of smaller scale mili-
tary operations. [see also A reign of Terror, Human Rights 
Violations in Aceh, 1998-2000, TAPOL Publication, March 
2000]. In the relatively liberal period of the post-Suharto era 
(1999 till 2002) TNI launched seven military operations: 
Operasi Wibawa, Operasi Sadar Rencong l,II,and III and 
Operasi Cinta Meunasah I, II and III. 
Gus Dur was forced to accept pressure from TNI and 
signed the Presidential Instruction, Inpres 4 and 7 in 2001, 
continued by President Megawati who signed Inpres no. 
1/2002. It gave the military and intelligence leeway to 
conduct military and counter-insurgency operations. 
A new territorial command was established in Aceh, 
Kodam Iskandar Muda - it was clear that the military 
wouldn't accept any compromise in Aceh. Some of the 
worse human rights violations occurred in this period: the 
Simpang KKA killings in May 1999, the Bantaqiah killings 
in July 1999 and the SIRA-Rakan shootings in late 2000. 
While TNI was continuing its mopping up operations in 
Aceh, an agreement was signed in Geneva on 9 December 
2002 between the Indonesian government and GAM. For a 
moment a fresh wind blew over Aceh and the war-weary 
Acehnese eagerly hoped that the cessation of hostilities 
followed by a peace process was really happening. It all 
ended when Megawati signed the Presidential Decree to 
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enact martial law in Aceh on 19 May of this year. In the six 
months of cessation of hostilities (COHA agreement) there 
were already clear signs of TNI sabotaging the agreement. 
Militia attacks on the official monitors of the agreement 
were the first signs of acts of sabotage. Jakarta's position in 
the negotiation process hardened and GAM had to give up 
their independence aspirations once and for all and hand 
over their arms. The talks in Tokyo to extend the COHA 
collapsed on 18 May and massive military operations 
started immediately. 
A costly war 
As always, the social and economic costs of the war are 
tremendous. The Jakarta-appointed Governor of Aceh 
Abdullah Puteh complains about the alarming rates of 
unemployment and poverty. The military has taken over the 
powers of the civilian sub district heads, creating a virtual 
military rule in Aceh. The extension of martial law will only 
mean further wreckage of society's structure in Aceh. 
Around 1800 persons have been arrested and the police 
have concluded 844 official reports of investigations. Trials 
in 375 cases have been completed and sentences have been 
handed down to various suspects on a variety of charges of 
providing food to GAM members to serving as GAM nego-
tiators. In most cases trials went ahead without transparency 
and without any possibility 
of a defence counsel for 
the defendants. 
Security Minister SBY 
admits that the war is 
draining the Indonesian 
economy. The official 
figures of the cost of the 
war are relatively low 
(US$141,2 million and a 
similar amount for the next 
six months) but simple 
calculations by human 
rights activists on the daily 
costs of 45,000 troops 
reach much higher figures. 
Money from other sources 
need to be added to this 
amount, including from the 
own TNI budget, POLRI 
budget and from the Aceh 
provincial administration. 
Dialogue is the 
only way to 
proceed 
The present condition in 
Aceh actually fulfils all the 
criteria the military need to 
.,, 
justify their acts. GAM is a strong movement with massive . 
support of the population. POLRI, the Indonesian Police, 
the force responsible for keeping law and order is far from 
able to keep the place secure. TNI argues that in places like 
Aceh and West Papua it is TNI who calls the shots. The 
civilian administration is in a woeful state, corrupt and inef-
fective. In the brief period of cease-fire during COHA it 
became clear that GAM's control over the districts in Aceh 
was much more substantial than Jakarta's. The simple 
conclusion drawn by TNI was for a military operation and 
establishing military rule over Aceh through martial law. 
·:: ~ ~;~A·cEH 
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After six months of protracted war, TNI has reached a 
point of no return, the incapacity of the military to make 
peace with the Acehnese, the same dead end TNI pursued in 
dealing with East Timor. 
The objectives of the massive operation in Aceh, as 
defined by the Jakarta authorities were twofold: the military 
operation was to be a decisive operation to finish off GAM 
once and for all while the overall objective was to establish 
a peaceful and secure Aceh. Neither of these objectives 
have been achieved. The pretension that TNI is able to quell 
the insurrection in Aceh has turned out to be an illusion. 
TNI is not only not winning the war but Jakarta is losing the 
peace in Aceh. An exit strategy is urgently needed in resolv-
ing the conflict in Aceh. 
Renewed talks are the only way out. The COHA agree-
ment actually paved the way for including elements of 
Acehnese civil society in the talks. The talks between the 
two warring parties GAM and RI (Republic of Indonesia) 
turned out to be limited and lacking room to manoeuvre. 
The inclusion of active persons in the Acehnese community 
in the future talks will give new impetus and a positive input 
for a prolonged and sustainable peace in Aceh. * 
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Hundreds of political trials in Aceh 
The trial of members of the negotiators' team has put paid to hopes for the resumption of dialogue and 
the non-military approach in solving the problem of Aceh. And the trial of student and women activists 
in Aceh is proof that everybody can be targeted in Aceh at the moment. Most of the activists have been 
given heavy sentences, having been charged with terror, treason or conspiracy against the state. 
The trial of GAM's negotiation team 
Five former members of the negotiation team, who were 
involved in peace talks on the GAM side, have been given 
long sentences in trials in Aceh recently. On 21 October, 
three negotiators of GAM were sentenced to prison terms of 
between 11 years and 15 years. The chief of the negotiation 
team, Sofyan Ibrahim Tiba was sentenced to 15 years. Amni 
Ahmad Marzuki and Muhammad Usman Lampo Awe were 
given 13 years and 12 years respectively. Two other 
members of the team Nashiruddin bin Ahmed and Teuku 
Kamaruzzaman, were sentenced by the court to 13 years 
each on 22 October. 
All of them were arrested on 18 May this year on their 
way to the airport to 
join the peace talks in I 
Tokyo. The police in 
Aceh freed them as 
the Tokyo talks 
began. However they 
were rearrested when 
the negotiations broke 
down soon after the 
Indonesian govern-
ment declared the 
military emergency 
status for Aceh on 19 
May 2003. 
Long sentences had 
been expected as the 
prosecutor had 
called for heavy 
sentences. In the 
case of Teuku 
Nashiruddin Ahmed and Sofyan Ibra-
him Tiba sentenced 13 and 15 years 
Kamaruzzaman, one of a GAM negotiators, the prosecutor 
requested 16 years in jail on 27 September. He was accused 
of terrorism and treason. At a separate trial, the prosecutor 
recommended a 16-year term for Tengku Muhammad 
Usman and 15 years for Amni bin Ahmad Marzuki for the 
same charges. The heaviest sentence was sought for the 
former GAM negotiator, Sofyan Ibrahim Tiba. The prose-
cutor asked the court to sentence him to 18 years. Together 
with Sofyan is Nashiruddin Ahmed. He was also recom-
mended for 16 years (Reuters, Sept 23). 
Sofyan denied that he was a member of GAM, saying that 
he was only a member of negotiation team who agreed to 
represent GAM during the talks. He said he only agreed to 
be on the negotiation team to help the peace process. He 
argued there was nothing wrong with his involvement in the 
peace process. If he could be tried, members of the team 
representing Indonesian side should also be tried for 
involvement. Most of those on trial believe that the govern-
ment has trumped up the charges against them (AFP, 10 
October 2003). 
All the defendants rejected the charges of terrorism, 
conspiracy and treason. All of them are being charged under 
the Anti Terrorism Law 15 of 2003. This new legislation 
was enacted after the Bali bombing to be applied mainly for 
terrorist acts not for people involved in separatist move-
ments. They were also charged under article 106 of the 
Criminal Code for rebellion against to the state. 
The lawyer Adnan Buyung Nasution argued that his 
clients could not be tried for their involvement in the peace 
process. Buyung complained that the judges failed to 
consider the efforts of the accused to reduce the scale of 
violence in Aceh in the period of the peace agreement. 
According to Buyung, they were only trying to solve the 
conflict in Aceh by peaceful means. The decision to charge 
them under the anti terrorism law was also unfounded. The 
court has not been able to prove their involvement in any 
terrorism acts, he said. 
Indonesia legal aid foundation of Aceh (LBH Aceh) 
argued that the court proceedings against GAM negotiators 
have destroyed the bridge to peace. According to Afridal 
Danni, LBH Aceh director, the most worrying impact of the 
arrest and prosecution of the negotiators was the vanishing 
opportunity for peace negotiations in the future. Danni 
further argued that the trials have destroyed peace building 
effort to solving the problem of Aceh. 
The arrest and trial of the GAM negotiators has provoked 
controversy. The negotiators had been given warranties for 
their safety. According to the Cessation of Hostility 
Agreement (COHA), their involvement could not be used to 
charge them. In fact the Regional Police Director for 
Investigation and Crime had issued SP 3 (Instruction to 
Stop Investigation) on 2 May 2003, because there was not 
enough evidence against them. Usually an SP3 letter will 
stop the investigation process because it affirms the absence 
of the proof and usually defendants are released and the 
case closed. But this is not the case for former GAM's nego-
tiators. 
The peace talks between GAM and the Indonesian govern-
ment were started during the Wahid government which took 
an initiative to solve the Aceh problem peacefully. The talks 
had been facilitated by the Henry Dunant Center (HDC), or 
the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue. The peace process in 
Aceh had been underway since June 2000. Under an agree-
ment in July 2001, assurances of safety to the members of 
the negotiator teams were given. However, in August 2001, 
those represent GAM were arrested. They were only 
released after a significant pressure from the international 
community. 
With regard to the latest arrests and trials, HDC said it 
hoped they have nothing to do with their position as 
members of the negotiator team. Meanwhile the GAM lead-
ership demanded the release of the negotiators' team as a 
precondition for further negotiations. 
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Student Activist jailed for demo 
In another court in Banda Aceh, a student activist from 
IAIN University, Reza Pahlevi, was sentenced to three 
years for organizing a rally in Banda Aceh. He was accused 
of airing and displaying hatred and insult towards the 
Indonesian government and of illegally organizing an event 
in Banda Aceh to protest the arrival of peace monitors from 
the Philippines on 23 December last year. 
During the demonstration Pahlevi and others carried 
banners with the slogans 'A Peaceful Indonesia means free-
dom for Aceh' and 'Aceh is a killing fields'. The trial of 
Pahlevi was intended to discourage other groups in Aceh 
from organizing similar demonstrations. Since martial law 
was declared, many student activists have fled Aceh and the 
police have targeted some students group. 
As coordinator of the demonstration, Pahlevi was arrested 
together with other students involved in the action. 
However, all of them were released immediately and no 
Anti martial law demonstration in Jakarta by Acehnese community. 
charges were brought. Pahlevi was re arrested on 24 May 
after the police broke into the student office in IAIN Ar-
Raniry University Banda Aceh. 
Reza Pahlevi is also a member of the Presidium Council 
of Activista Anti Militarism (Himpunan Mahasiswa Anti 
Militerism or HANTAM). HANTAM is concerned with the 
impact of militerism in Aceh. In his defense plea, he ques-
tioned the fact that no trials are being held for the killing of 
thousands of people in Aceh. At the same time the court was 
trying him and many other activists, nothing was being 
done regarding the many civilians killed in numerous 
villages in Aceh. 
Woman activist sentenced 
Another controversial case is the trial of a woman activist, 
Cut Nur Asykin who has been advocating a referendum as 
the way of solving the problem of Aceh. Cut Nur Asyikin is 
the head of a women's group called Srikandi Aceh 
concerned with women's empowerment. She has been 
involved in many activities to support the campaign for a 
referendum in Aceh. 
On 21 October 2003, Nur Asyikin was sentenced to 11 
years in prison. The judge found her guilty of treason. The 
sentence is 3 years less than the demand of the prosecutor 
ACEH 
who asked for 14 years. Her speech in 1999 during the mass 
really for a referendum demanded a referendum and chal-
lenged the legitimacy of the Indonesian government in 
Aceh was used to charge her. 
Despite the fact that she is not a member of GAM, her 
involvement as a member of the Joint Committee for 
Humanitarian Action (KBAK) during the peace agreement 
between GAM and Indonesian government was used to 
give her a heavy sentence and to connect her with GAM. 
Military justice 
The amount of arrested people is growing by the day and 
according to military people, more than 1500 people are 
detained. The PDMD, the local martial law administration 
have implemented a speedy way of putting the huge amount 
of people on trial. The Police in a record speed has 
concluded 844 reports of investigation and till mid 
November a record of 375 cases have been completed and 
a variety of sentences have been handed down to 
various suspects. The defendants vary from those 
accused of giving food or other logistic aid to GAM 
to those serving as negotiators. This new military 
type of law enforcement has been applied to 
acehnese civilians or non-combatants and lay 
persons, mostly family members of GAM personell. 
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International pressure increases for end to martial law 
Indonesia is coming under intense pressure from the international community to end its military offen-
sive in Aceh and to solve the conflict by political means. Recent statements by the European Union, 
the Japanese and US governments, the European Parliament, and the US Congress have expressed 
concern about the recent extension of martial law and the humanitarian crisis in the province. 
Joint statement by the EU, Japan and the US 
In a joint statement issued on 6 November, the EU, Japan 
and the US - which co-chaired the Tokyo preparatory 
conference on peace and reconstruction in Aceh in 
December 2002 - reminded President Megawati of her 
commitment before Parliament in August to end the state of 
military emergency as soon as possible. They called for the 
minimization of human suffering, an improvement in trans-
parency, and for access by international agencies and NGOs 
in an approach 'which includes humanitarian aid, restora-
tion of civil institutions and upholding the law'. 
European Parliament resolution 
This was followed by a European Parliament resolution 
on 20 November, which expressed deep concern at the 
extension of military operations, the ongoing violence 
including kidnappings and killings, particularly outside the 
major towns. It called on the Indonesian Government to 
stop the military offensive, to withdraw its troops, to resume 
talks with GAM, and to fully involve civil society - espe-
cially Acehnese women - in the dialogue and peace process. 
It further urged the Government to provide immediate and 
unimpeded access for all humanitarian agencies, indepen-
dent human rights observers, diplomatic representatives, 
and journalists and UN agencies and NGOs that can assist 
in the protection of civilians, particularly displaced persons. 
It called for the Government to 'bring to account those 
responsible for violations of human rights in Aceh, as well 
as other parts of the country', for UN human rights monitors 
to be allowed to visit, and for the Red Cross to have 
comprehensive access to prisoners in police in police and 
military detention. 
Addressing the humanitarian crisis, the European 
Parliament called for the Indonesian Government to allow 
aid to be delivered directly to those in need, to prevent 
attacks on humanitarian agencies and their workers and for 
the authorities to work in collaboration with other actors to 
provide batter capacity to deal with humanitarian needs and 
to care for internally displaced persons. 
US Congress resolution 
In the US Congress, signatures are being sought for a 
resolution submitted by Congressman Joseph Crowley call-
ing for the Indonesian Government and GAM to 'immedi-
ately declare a ceasefire and halt hostilities in ... Aceh, end 
all human rights violations, and return to negotiations with 
significant Acehnese civil society and international involve-
ment'. Noting that President Bush and senior US officials 
have stated that the conflict in Aceh is not amenable to a 
military solution, it calls for the Government and armed 
forces of Indonesia to immediately end martial law and 
withdraw all non-organic troops, intelligence forces, and 
special forces such as Kopassus and Brimob. 
Dealing with the forcible return of Acehnese asylum 
seekers from Malaysia in contravention of international 
refugee law [see separate item: 'Acehnese refugees deported 
by Malaysia'], the resolution calls on the Malaysian 
Government to refrain from such behaviour, to allow the 
asylum seekers full access to UNHCR representatives, and 
to release those currently in detention. It also presses the 
Indonesian Government to prosecute and bring to justice 
those responsible for human rights crimes in particular the 
killing of the Achenese human rights lawyer and US perma-
nent resident, Jafar Siddiq Hamzah in August 2000. 
Finally the resolution urges the US Government to 
review its military assistance to Indonesia and for the 
Indonesian Government to refrain from using US-supplied 
weaponry in Aceh. * 
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Acehnese refugees deported by Malaysia 
Despite pressure from many human rights groups concerned for their safety, hundreds of Acehnese 
refugees are being deported by the Malaysian government to war-torn Aceh. Thousands of Acehnese 
have fled their homeland since the Indonesian government declared martial law in May this year and 
many have gone to Malaysia. The Malaysian government's rejection of the refugees is part of the polit-
ical denial by many ASEAN countries of the problem in Aceh. 
In August, September and October, several mass arrests 
of Acehnese took place. On 19 August, 400 asylum seekers 
were arrested by the Malaysian police outside the office of 
the United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR) in Kuala Lumpur. The police mounted road 
blocks on all roads to the UNHCR compound, checking 
documents of asylum seekers as they approached the office. 
All of them were going to the UNHCR office to apply for 
registration and temporary protection (TP) letters. During 
this operation 232 Acehnese including 17 women and 4 
children were sent to Langkap immigration detention camp 
in Perak, while several individuals were released by the 
police after showing their UNHCR documents. A police 
presence was maintained outside the compound for several 
weeks, forcing the agency to close down for several days. 
The second wave of arrests occurred on 2 September 
when about 40 asylum seekers were arrested outside the 
UNHCR office. Police had again stationed themselves 
outside the compound, saying they would arrest any illegal 
immigrant whom UNHCR staff were forced to tum away. 
Many were deterred from making their way to the UNCHR 
for fear of arrest. A UNHCR team was eventually able to 
gain access to the Langkap detention camp and register 
asylum seekers there. 
Crackdown 
The biggest crackdown was on 16 September when police 
raided an Acehnese settlement in Limau Manis, Putrajaya. 
An estimated 2, 000 Acehnese were in the settlement. Up to 
six police trucks were used to arrest 400 Acehnese, who 
were sent to immigration detention centers. Four Acehnese 
were reported drowned in a nearby river, and many more 
have been missing since the operation. The possessions of 
many of the detainees were confiscated. 
According to Edi, one of the detainees, during his time in 
the camp, up to 50 new Acehnese arrived at the camp every 
day. He saw the police beat detainees and confiscate their 
possessions. 
On 2 October, 20 buses of detained immigrants, includ-
ing 402 Acehnese arrested in the Limau Manis raid, were 
taken to Port Klang and loaded onto the Indonesian ship 
KM Taruna Sakti, which departed that day for Belawan, 
North Sumatra. The ship did not arrive at its intended desti-
nation, and the whereabouts of the deportees remain 
unknown. 
Then on 17 October, 33 Acehnese were arrested during a 
police raid on homes and work places in Kampung Sungai 
Nibong Kecil, Bukit Jambul, Penang. 
The amount of Acehnese living in Malaysia is indefinite 
but an estimate of 20,000 live in Malaysia without legal 
status. Many of those arrested over the past few months are 
asylum-seekers who have arrived in the country since the 
declaration of martial law in Aceh on 19 May 2003. The 
refugees are becoming a vital sources of information about 
the many abuses and killing of villagers under martial law. 
Many of those who have just arrived are able to reveal the 
real situation on the ground. 
The UNHCR in Kuala Lumpur started issuing TP letters 
for Acehnese in July 2003, verifying them as "persons of 
concern" under the UNHCR's mandate and recommending 
that they not be arrested, detained, or deported for a period 
of 6 months, corresponding to the initial period of martial 
law in Aceh. While Malaysia is not a party to the 1951 
Refugee Convention, UNHCR holds that Acehnese seeking 
protection in Malaysia are civilians fleeing armed conflict 
between the Indonesian military and GAM. Malaysia is 
therefore bound by the internationally-acknowledged prin-
ciple of non-refoulement, which prohibits the forcible 
return of a person to a place where he or she faces persecu-
tion .. 
The Malaysian government claims tµat the Acehnese are 
not asylum-seekers but rather illegal immigrants seeking 
employment in the country. Foreign Minister Syed Hamid 
Al bar rejected criticism from the UNHCR and international 
groups, stating: "It is not right for UNHCR to register the 
Acehnese as possible refugees when they are not refugees." 
However, in November the authorities did postpone indefi-
nitely the decision to deport a group of eight asylum-seek-
ers held at the Langkap camp. 
The Indonesian government has called for the return of 
the Acehnese, stating that there are no grounds for them to 
seek asylum since the situation in Aceh is under control - a 
claim contested by its own national human rights commis-
sion, Komnas HAM. 
The UNHCR maintains that asylum-seekers are not ille-
gal immigrants under international law, and has urged the 
Malaysian government to release the detainees and grant 
them temporary protection. 
Temporary Protection would mean allowing the asylum 
seekers and refugees to be registered with the UNHCR and 
to remain in Malaysia until such time as the situation in 
Aceh allowed for their safe return. * 
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West Papua asserts its Pacific status 
The call for Melanesian West Papua to resume its rightful role in Pacific regional affairs was the key 
demand made to delegates attending the 34th meeting of the Pacific Islands Forum in Auckland from 
14-16 August. Around 50 West Papuans and solidarity activists met in Auckland to lobby the Forum 
and attend the Fourth annual International Solidarity Meeting on West Papua. 
A primary objective of the 
Forum lobby is for West Papua to 
be granted Forum observer status 
a,s a prelude to eventual full 
membership. Although that may 
take a while, there is now a 
heightened awareness of West 
Papua in New Zealand/Aoteroa 
and the Pacific. 
An important dialogue has been 
established with Forum leaders 
and delegates and while the over-
all wording of the final Forum 
communique (see box below) was 
a disappointment, private support 
for the West Papua cause was 
expressed by many off the record. 
A parallel Civil Society Forum, 
broadly representative of Pacific 
NGOs, formally endorsed a number 
of West Papuan demands, including 
the request for observer status. 
Concern about continuing violence 
As they did in last year's communique, Forum leaders 
expressed concern about continuing violence in West 
Papua, but this time went further in urging the Indonesian 
authorities to bring to justice the perpetrators of serious 
crimes committed in West Papua. 
THIRTY-FOURTH PACIFIC ISLANDS FORUM 
FORUM COMMUNIQUE 
PAPUA 
74. Forum Leaders reiterated their support for special 
autonomy for Papua which they considered to offer realis-
tic prospects for peaceful resolution of the situation in 
Papua. Noting that the 2001 special autonomy law had yet 
to be fully implemented, they urged the sovereign authority, 
Indonesia, to expedite promulgation of the necessary regu-
lations and to take other steps needed to give effect to 
special autonomy. 
7 5. Leaders expressed concern about the continuing 
violence in Papua and called on all parties to protect and 
uphold the human rights of all residents in Papua and to 
resolve differences by peaceful means. They also urged the 
Indonesian authorities to bring to justice the perpetrators of 
serious crimes committed in the province of Papua. 
Under pressure from Australia and Indonesia - a Forum 
'dialogue partner' - Forum leaders reiterated their support 
for special autonomy despite the fact that it has been under-
mined by Indonesia's disastrous attempt to divide West 
Papua into three provinces [see separate article]. 
Participants from the Auckland Solidarity meeting 
Speaking for his fellow leaders, Dr John Ondawame, 
spokesperson for the Free Papua Movement (OPM) and 
member of the Papua Presidium Council, urged Forum 
leaders to "call on Indonesia to enter into a process of 
peaceful dialogue to consider all options for the future of 
the territory". 
In a significant move, Dr Ondawame who is based at the 
West Papuan People's Representative Office in Port Vila, 
Vanuatu, was included in the Vanuatu Government delega-
tion to the Forum. 
The Pacific Islands Forum is a key strategic target for 
West Papuan lobbying. Its membership of 16 countries 
includes. West Papua's Melanesian neighbours in Papua 
New Gumea, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and Fiji as well 
the regional powers Australia and New Zealand and island 
micro states such as Nauru, Niue and Tuvalu. Support for 
West Papua's right to self-determination has previously 
been expressed by Vanuatu, Nauru and Tuvalu in other 
international fora including the United Nations. 
Whilst still under Dutch rule, West Papuan leaders 
attended the very first meeting of another Pacific institution, 
the South Pacific Commission, when it was founded in 
1950. West Papua was also a founder member of the Pacific 
Council of Churches. 
Forµm urged to remember forgotten 
Pacific country 
Much of the ground work for the Forum lobbying was 
undertaken at the southern component of the fourth annual 
meeting of the International Solidarity Meeting on West 
Papua (IS.MWP) held in Auckland from 8 to 1 O August. 
The meetmg - the first to be held in the Asia-Pacific region 
continued on page 15 
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Military sets Papua agenda 
While much attention is focused on the TNI's brutal war in Aceh, the military is also using its fight 
against separatism in West Papua as a means of resuming its dominant role in Indonesian political and 
security affairs. Recent violent incidents and the threat of a military crackdown suggest that the TN/ 
has indeed regained the upper hand and is involved in a systematic attempt to destabilise the territory 
and eradicate support for independence. 
Three-way divide and rule tactics 
A presidential instruction (Inpres) issued in January 2003 
to split Papua into three provinces provoked a storm of 
protest and widespread incomprehension about the inten-
tions of the central government when it was announced. It 
directly contradicted a special autonomy law passed in 
October 2001 and angered both opponents and supporters 
of special autonomy. Many Papuans regarded the split as a 
move to undermine their support for self-determination and 
their calls for dialogue on the future status of West Papua. 
An editorial in the Jakarta Post newspaper noted that virtu-
ally all Papuans bitterly opposed the split and 'considered it 
to be part of a central government divide-and-rule plot to 
allow the Jakarta elite to keep on plundering the rich natural 
resources of the province' (1) 
A further sinister explanation for the Inpres, suggested at 
the time, was that it would enable the TNI to increase the 
number of its troops and consolidate its economic and polit-
ical power in West Papua (2). 
The conflicts caused by the Inpres and other recent devel-
opments have all the hallmarks of Indonesian military intel-
ligence operations aimed at de-stabilising West Papua. In 
March 2002, Lieutenant AM Hendropriyono, head of 
Indonesia's central intelligence agency, BIN, and retired 
General Susilo· Bambang Yudhoyono, Coordinating 
Minister for Social and Political Affairs, arranged for 240 
Papuans to travel to Jakarta and call for the division of 
Papua in a meeting with President Megawati and high-rank-
ing officials. In an October 2002 article, the Far Eastern 
Economic Review Jakarta Bureau Chief, John McBeth, 
quoted an unnamed senior military source as saying that 
one of the primary reasons for the proposed division was to 
cement control by the TNI over the richest of the three 
provinces (3). 
According to the International Crisis Group (ICG) think 
tank, Hendropriyono was later warned that 'leaving Papua 
as a single province would nurture Papuan nationalism, and 
the threat of separatism and national disintegration could be 
effectively confronted only by dividing it'. Statements by 
various officials 'suggested that they were deeply concerned 
over the gains that pro-independence groups seemed to be 
making abroad in terms of gaining international support for 
a re-examination of the 1969 Act of Free Choice' (4). 
When the Government attempted to implement the three-
way split by declaring a new province of Central Irian Jaya 
in Timika on 23 August, bloody clashes resulted in five 
people being killed and up to 50 injured. The Government ' 
was forced to postpone the split, but refused to cancel it. 
Predictably, instead of seeking to resolve the crisis by peace-
ful means and entering into meaningful dialogue with West 
Papuan representatives, the Government sent an additional 
2,000 troops - four new battalions - to the territory. 
The human rights group ELSHAM immediately warned that 
destabilising violence would result from the military deploy-
ment (5). The troop build-up appears to be continuing. 
Senior TNI officials have reportedly stated that Papua 
would be the target of a massive campaign after [the] war in 
Aceh (6). 
OPM leader and nine others killed 
The fact that the TNI is intent on aggression, rather than 
peace, was made brutally clear by the killing by Kopassus 
special forces of Yustinus Murib, a regional commander of 
the Free Papua Movement (OPM), and nine other men, at 
Yalengga subdistrict near the highlands capital of Wamena 
on 5 November. ·Reports indicate that some of those killed 
were civilians. 
TN/ soldiers gloat over body of Justinus Murib 
Murib was an active supporter of the 'Zone of Peace' initia-
tive (see below). He was killed on the same day that a letter 
signed by him addressed to the UN and the governments of 
Indonesia and Australia, calling for a peaceful dialogue with 
Jakarta, was dramatically read out on Australian SBS tele-
vision's dateline programme. 
Photos which appeared in the Indonesian press showed 
soldiers treating one of the victims 'like an animal they had 
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hunted and killed'. An outraged Jakarta Post said that 'even in 
the most brutal of. wars such behaviour is intolerable'. It 
added: 'If a person can still say there is nothing wrong with 
four soldiers treating a corpse in this manner, then we may 
conclude that there is something wrong with that person's 
mind' (7). 
Destabilisation strategy 
The current strategy to create conflict and instability and 
eradicate support for independence can be traced back to 
the killing of independence leader, Theys Eluay, by 
Kopassus special forces officers on I 0 November 2001. 
The assassination closely followed the rejection by Theys 
Eluay and fellow members of the Papua Presidium leader-
ship council of the special autonomy law passed in October 
2001. The law - which is now being flouted by the central 
government - was introduced in an apparent attempt to 
reduce support for independence. 
Seven Kopassus soldiers were convicted by a military 
tribunal of ill-treatment which resulted in Theys Eluay's 
death. They were sentenced to between three and three-
and-half years imprisonment. Significantly, the authorities 
failed to uncover the background to the crime and to iden-
tify the chain of command involved. However, Kopassus 
soldiers said at their trials that Theys was murdered to 
prevent him declaring independence and thwartin~ the 
implementation of special autonomy (8). Army chief of 
staff, General Ryamizard Ryacudu described the perpetra-
tors as 'heroes' who had carried out a legitimate act in 
defence of the unitary state of Indonesia. 
There is also strong evidence, according to the Indonesian 
police and human rights organisations that Kopassus or 
other army units were involved in the killing of one 
Indonesian and two American employees of the Freeport 
copper-and-gold mine in Timika in August 2002 (9). 
Reports suggested that the attack on a convoy of buses 
carrying teachers and children from Freeport's international 
school was discussed in advance at the highest level of the 
army. Despite an ongoing investigation by the FBI, the 
army has so far succeeded in covering up the truth of what 
happened and who was responsible. The US Congress has 
opposed the normalisation of US military relations with 
Indonesia because of Indonesia's failure to co-operate fully 
with the FBI investigation [see separate item]. 
The then military commander of West Papua, Major-
General Mahidin Simbolon, himself a Kopassus officer and 
a veteran of counter-insurgency operations in East Timor, 
was quick to blame the OPM, but many suspected the attack 
was perpetrated by the military as a means of warning 
Freeport not to deprive the army of its lucrative security 
role at the mine. 
The Freeport mine - part owned by the UK company Rio 
Tinto - is highly controversial because of the history of 
human rights violations linked to the mine, the millions of 
dollars paid to the military for security, the comp~y's 
denial of indigenous land rights and the severe environ-
mental degradation caused by the mining operations. On 9 
October, a massive landslide, thought to be caused by 
unsafe production levels, killed ei.ght workers and injure~ 
five others. The Indonesian envrronmental NGO, Walhi 
(Friends of the Earth Indo~esia) called for an in~depth 
investigation into 'the real cnmes and thousands of victims 
at the Freeport-Rio Tinto mine' and for the Contract of Work 
between Freeport and the Indonesian Government to be re-
negotiated (10). 
elan ga 
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Demo in Jakarta condemning Freeport's complicity in human . 
rights violations 
A huge demonstration, involving hundreds of protesters 
and numerous Indonesian NGOs and Papuan groups, 
including the Alliance of Papuan Students (AMP) ~nd 
Koteka Tribal Assembly (Demmak), took place outside 
Freeport's Jakarta office on 28 October. Speakers 
condemned Freeport's complicity in destroying 'cultural 
rights, human rights, the environment and democracy' and 
for its involvement in 'political manipulation from the Act 
of Free Choice' onwards (11 ). An action in solidarity with 
the Jakarta protesters took place at Rio Tinto's offices in 
London on 24 October. 
Troops 'sweep' central highla~ds . 
In further evidence of a concerted campaign to undermme 
peace and stability in the territory, troops from Kopassus 
and the army's strategic command, Kostrad, launched a 
crackdown in April in response to an attack on an ammuni-
tion dump in the central highlands town of Wamena. Many 
Papuans were arbitrarily arrested and detained, bea~en and 
tortured. Massive 'sweeping' operations through highland 
villages led to the killing of civilians and the destruction of 
homes, schools ·and crops. Around 1,000 people were 
forced to flee into the forests where they had no access to 
food. At least 16 people died, either at the hands of the 
troops or due to exposure or starvation. The military 
refused access to church groups and humanitarian workers. 
Film of the devastation caused by the sweepings was shown 
on the SBS dateline programme on 5 November which 
included film of the OPM letter calling for peace in West 
Papua (see above). 
During the raid on the Wamena army arsenal, two soldiers 
and one local person were killed. Again, the military 
blamed the OPM for the attack, but once more there are 
strong suspicions that the TNI masterminded the attack to 
justify the crackdown which then took place. The incident 
also paved the way for the return of Kopassus troops to 
West Papua after they had been withdrawn because of 
outrage at their involvement in the killing of Theys Eluay. 
Nine soldiers were tried by a military tribunal in relation 
to the attack on the Wamena arsenal. One was convicted of 
supplying weapons to the OPM and eight others were 
convicted of negligent performance of their guard duties. 
They were sentenced to jail terms of up to 14 months. 
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However, military trials are designed to reveal little of the 
truth about incidents of this nature. Their purpose is to 
ensure that proceedings are taken only against the lower-
ranking soldiers who carried out the operation and do not 
reveal anything about the role of more senior officers. 
Oz new ties with Kopassus spark outrage 
Turning a blind eye to Kopassus involvement in these and 
other atrocities in West Papua, Aceh and East Timor, and its 
association with the militant Muslim Laskar Jihad militias, 
the Australian Government announced in August that it 
would resume training links with the TNI, including 
Kopassus troops, which were suspended in 1999 following 
the TNI's role in orchestrating violence against pro-inde-
pendence supporters in East Timor. 
In doing this - in the name of the 'war against terror' -
Australia demonstrated it has not learned a single lesson 
from the past when it maintained high-level links with the 
Indonesian military despite its brutal occupation of East 
Timor under the Suharto regime. It ignores the fact that the 
TNI is now involved in similar military campaigns against 
the people of Aceh and West Papua and .that systematic acts 
of state terror by the TNI and Kopassus have claimed many 
times more victims than acts of terror by non-state actors. 
Demonstration in London in front of the RTZ office. 
The Australian Financial Review newspaper noted that 
'although training in the past was supposed to concentrate 
on developing anti-terrorism skills, it expanded into exer-
cises in which Kopassus were taught how to ambush 
members of the East Timorese resistance' (12). According 
to Dr Damien Kingsbury, author of Power Politics and the 
Indonesian Military: 'The history of Kopassus's ... activities 
reads more like that of a terrorist organisation, which is not 
surprising given that the techniques and tactics of terror are 
explicitly outlined in a confidential Kopassus training 
manual' (13). 
The decision to resume training provoked understandable 
anger amongst Australians familiar with the TNI's record of 
abuse. Even the Australian Defence Force, conscious that its 
own troops have been threatened by Kopassus in East Timor, 
have objected to visits to Australia by individuals involved in 
human rights violations. In October, the TNI was forced to 
cancel a visit to Perth when its Australian counterpart vetoed 
the inclusion in the delegation of the Kopassus commander, 
Major-General Sriyanto, who is currently on trial for his 
involvement in the Tanjung Priok massacre of Muslim 
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demonstrators in 1984 [see separate item]. 
The training is currently on hold, but there is no sugges-
tion that the Australian Government will withdraw from its 
policy of re-engagement with the TNI. 
Targeting of human rights defenders 
The TNI policy. of creating instability in West Papua is 
facilitated by a culture of impunity and the intimidation of 
human rights defenders to prevent them carrying out their 
normal work. Threats to their lives and personal safety, 
harassment and other forms of intimidation have become 
routine (14). 
In October 2002, ELSHAM's Jakarta Office was attacked 
and the co-ordinator of the office just escaped abduction by 
unknown assailants the same month. The office has been 
closed as a result of continuing threats. The intemationally-
respected supervisor of ELSHAM, John Rumbiak, 
presently a Visiting Fellow at New York's Columbia 
University, has been forced to delay his return to Papua for 
personal safety reasons. 
On 28 December 2002, the wife and daughter of Johannes 
Bonay, executive director of ELSHAM, were shot and 
wounded while being driven to Jayapura from the border 
with Papua New Guinea. Bonay h\mself had planned to 
accompany them and it is likely that he 
was the target (14). 
In a crude attempt to bankrupt 
ELSHAM, the Trikora military 
command in now suing Johannes 
Bonay and John Rumbiak for substan-
tial damages for defamation in relation 
to ELSHAM's initial findings that the 
military were involved in the Freeport 
killings in August 2002. 
TNI linked to militias 
The TNI has also been linked with the 
arrival in Papua of the Laskar Jihad 
militia, involved in much of the inter-
religious conflicts in Maluku and 
Sulawesi with the support or 
connivance of the military, and the 
formation of the pro-Jakarta Satgas 
Merah Putih (Red-and-White) militias. 
Major-General Mahidin Simbolon played a prominent role 
in creating militia forces in East Timor and it is likely that 
he is responsible for the presence of these destabilising 
militia forces in West Papua. 
Laskar Jihad has conducted military-style training in West 
Papua and is known to have substantial supplies of 
weapons. Publications circulating in West Papua have 
accused Christians there of representing a threat to 
Indonesia's territorial integrity by supporting pro-indepen-
dence demands. 
Civil society demands peace 
Civil society's response to the tensions caused by the 
TNl's destabilisation strategy has been to repeat its calls for 
West Papua to be made a Zone of Peace. 
Since March 2002, civil society groups and religious lead-
ers have been pursuing various conflict resolution initia-
tives. A Peace Task Force was set up in July 2002, and a 
conference for peace in Papua, co-sponsored by Papua's 
governor, police chief, the provincial parliament and civil 
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soc~ety groups, was held in Jayapura in October 2002. 
t-v:taJor-General Mahidin Simbolon was the only local offi-
~1al w_ho refused to participate. Senior military officers, 
mcludmg armed forces chief, General Endriartono Sutarto 
have ~l~o re~sed to co-operate, further demonstrating that 
the military 1s not part of the solution, but the problem, in 
West Papua. 
The peace conference decided to establish a Peace 
c.ommission to engage in conflict prevention, promotion of 
dialogue and popular education to promote Papua as a 'Zone 
of Peace' . This initiative is being co-ordinated by 
ELSHAM. 
. Foreign governments claim to support peaceful dialogue 
m West Papua, but because they are committed to strength-
ening relations with the TNI, their analyses and policy 
prescriptions are invariably self-serving and ignore the role 
of the TNI as a root cause of conflict. 
In a joint statement issued with President Megawati 
following their meeting in Bali on 22 October, President 
Bush called on the separatist groups in Aceh and Papua to 
pursue their grievances through peaceful means. He further 
commended the Indonesian government's 'efforts to resolve 
communal conflicts through law enforcement, respect for 
human rights, dialogue, and reconciliation'. 
The President deliberately ignored the fact that the TNI 
has actively thwarted dialogue and promoted conflict in 
Aceh, Papua, Maluku and elsewhere in Indonesia. His fail-
ure to acknowledge the reality of the situation in Indonesia 
is dangerous and can only increase the threat posed by the 
TNI to the stability and security of West Papua and other 
areas of conflict. 
Governments must do more than indulge in the rhetoric of 
peace. They must support by effective diplomacy and, 
where appropriate, financial assistance the civilian-led 
Zone of Peace initiative, press the Indonesian Government 
to. enter into a process. of peaceful dialogue, mediated by a 
third neutral party, with West Papuan representatives and 
suspend all forms of co-operation with the TNI. 
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continuation from page 10 
- was superbly hosted by the Auckland-based Indonesia 
Human Rights Committee and Pax Christi NZ. It attracted 
around 50 West Papuans and activists from countries as far 
apart as Aotearoa/New Zealand, Australia, Fiji, West Papua, 
Indonesia, USA, Hong Kong, UK and Ireland. 
The eight West Papuan guests included Dr Ondawame, 
Agus Alua, Deputy Secretary General of the Papua 
Presidium Council, John Rumbiak of the human rights 
group, ELSHAM and the formidable grassroots environ-
mental activist, Mama Yosepha Alomang, renowned for her 
work opposing the environmental destruction caused by the 
giant Freeport copper-and-gold mine. 
The meeting was held in a traditional Maori meeting 
house and Maori activists provided new insights into 
indigenous peoples' struggles for self-determination. 
The delegates confirmed their unequivocal support for 
West Papua's right to self-determination and condemned the 
deteriorating human rights situation in the territory. In a 
statement issued ahead of the Forum meeting entitled West 
Papua: The Forgotten Pacific Country, they urged Forum 
leaders to press Indonesia to end military operations, to start 
a process of demilitarisation of West Papua and to renew 
efforts to resolve the conflict by peaceful means according 
to the West Papuans' call for their country to be made a 
'Land of Peace'. They also called upon member states to 
end all forms of military cooperation with Indonesia, 
including the training of military personnel, and to support 
the campaign calling for the United Nations to review its 
conduct at the time of the fraudulent 'Act of Free Choice' in 
1969 [see http: //westpapuaaction.buz.org/unreview/ and 
'West Papua Campaign launched at UN', TAPOL Bulletin 
No. 166/ 167, p. 27]. 
Later in a highlight of the week, participants joined other 
Auckland activists in a flag-waving vigil in front of the 
city's Sheraton Hotel to greet dignitaries arriving for the 
Forum op~ning ce~emony. Chanting "Free West Papua", 
the gathering hastily re-located to a side entrance of the 
hotel ~hen the guests were unceremoniously dumped there 
to avoid the demonstrators. The protest attracted prominent 
cove~age on New Zealand television's main evening news. 
Media coverage of the solidarity lobby and associated 
events - including a speaking tour of Aotearoa/New Zealand 
by John Rumbiak - was also extensive. 
~~ch was achiev_ed in a hectic week of networking, strate-
gismg and lob~ymg. Th~ solidarity movement has grown 
stronger, establtsh_ed ~ vita! presence in the Pacific region 
and s~rengthened its ties with the West Papuan leadership. 
Most importantly, the work undertaken in raising awareness 
of West Papua at the Forum has laid a solid foundation for 
generating meaningful support for the cause in future years . 
[The northern component of the Fourth ISMWP was held in 
Brussels in June. A statement issued by that meeting is 
available at http://tapol] 
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Classified docuDlents confirDl US support 
for rigged 'Act of Free Choice' 
Recently-obtained classified U.S. Government documents reveal US complicity in the subterfuge 
whereby the UN General Assembly gave its approval to the 1969 'Act of Free Choice', which denied 
the people of West Papua their right to self-determination. The documents show that the US knew the 
process was rigged, that it did nothing about Indonesian coercion and death threats against Papuans 
and that it lobbied behind the scenes to ensure the process was accepted by the UN. 
The 'Act of Free Choice' was promised to West Papua in 
an agreement brokered by the US and signed at the United 
Nations in 1962 between the outgoing Colonial power, the 
Dutch, and the Indonesian Government which claimed the 
territory. 
George Washington University's "National Security 
Archives"' Brad Simpson compiled the declassified docu-
ments collected in research entitled 'Funding Repression: 
The Indonesian - East Timar Project'. The compilation of 
declassified U.S. Government messages and memoranda 
documents U.S. Government actions and policies regarding 
Indonesia's annexation of West Papua in 1969. The docu-
ments confirm a disturbing example of Cold War realpolitik 
in which a patently undemocratic process enabled the 
Government of Indonesian dictator Soeharto to assume 
control of a vast territory populated by a people racially, 
religiously and culturally distinct from the great majority of 
the Indonesian population. 
The declassified messages and briefing papers - obtained 
through the Freedom of Information Act - document US 
(and UN) awareness that the 'Act of Free Choice' was delib-
erately and fatally flawed in conception and implementa-
tion. They provide a valuable addition to Dr John Saltford's 
recent expose of the UN's role in this disgraceful episode in 
his book 'The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover 
of West Papua, 1962-1969: The Anatomy of Betrayal'. 
Because of its role in brokering negotiations between the 
Netherlands and Indonesia, the US bore a special responsibil-
ity to ensure the fairness of the process through which the 
Papuan people were to determine their future . The docu-
ments reveal that the U.S. manifestly failed in this responsi-
bility. 
Negotiations for the 1962 'New York. Agreeme~t' were 
organised and mediated by the semor US diplomat 
Ellsworth Bunker, who worked to defuse a festering 
confrontation between the Dutch and the Government of 
President Soekarno. Soekarno, father of the current 
Indonesian President, was determined to unite all of the 
Dutch colonial holdings in the region under the Indonesian 
flag and sent troops to West Papua in an attempt to secure 
it. Ironically, those troops were led by then Colonel 
Soeharto, the brutal dictator who would subsequently force 
Soekarno from power in 1966. In 1962, the Kennedy 
Administration, anxious to avoid an anti-colonialist war and 
concerned that the unpredictable nationalist Indonesian 
leader might tum to Moscow or Beijing for help, employed 
Bunker to press the Dutch to forego plans to acc~rd the 
Papuans independence and instead make a deal with the 
Indonesians. 
The resulting 'New York Agreement' placed the Papuans 
under what amounted to an Indonesian trusteeship for seven 
years, with the promise of an 'act of free choice' at the end 
of that interregnum. The UN, according to the agreement, 
was to provide an interim minimum seven month adminis-
trative presence, allowing the Dutch a diplomatic departure, 
and, crucially, was also to provide oversight ('assistance and 
participation') to ensure the act of free choice was free and 
fair. Papuans were afforded no role in the 1962 negotiations. 
The succeeding seven years of rule from Jakarta were a 
disaster for the Papuans. Under the guise of rooting out 
ineffectual, small scale resistance mounted by poorly armed 
Papuans resisting brutal Indonesian rule, the Indonesian 
military mounted successive campaigns which exacted an 
enormous toll on the defenseless civilian population. The 
Indonesians broadly failed to provide critical health 
services, education or economic development to the 
Papuans who had languished under Dutch colonial rule. The 
Indonesian government launched exploitation of the vast 
natural riches in West Papua well before the 'Act of Free 
Choice' with benefits accruing to the Indonesians and 
foreign firms, notably the U.S.-based Freeport McMoran, 
which in 1967 began excavation of what is today the 
world's largest copper and gold mine. 
Papuan support for independence 
The documents reveal clear U.S. understanding that as a 
consequence of Jakarta's misrule most Papuans, given a 
free and fair choice, would opt for independence. A May 
1967 U.S. Embassy report noted that the Papuans 'resent 
(the) arrogance of Indonesian military and blame 
Indonesian officials for drastic shortages of goods and poor 
living standards now prevailing'. A separate Embassy 
report explained that the Indonesian Government's presence 
in West Papua 'is expressed primarily in the form of the 
Army'. An October 1967 Embassy airgram cited a Papuan 
holding a senior position in the Indonesian Foreign ministry 
as stating '99 percent of the Papuan population favors inde-:-
pendence from Indonesia' . A July 1969 'confidential' 
airgram from the Embassy reported that 'grievances and 
anti-GOI sentiment are quite real, however, and there is 
little question that a great majority of the non-Stone Age 
Irianese favor a termination of Indonesian rule'. The 
message continued: 'Opposition to the GOI stems from 
economic deprivation over the years, military repression 
and capriciousness and mal-administration.' 
The report concluded that 'probably a decided majority of 
the Irianese people, and possibly 85 to 90 percent, are in 
sympathy with the Free Papua cause or at least intensely 
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dis likes Indonesians'. The message identified among the 
Indonesian rulers 'a tendency to degrade the l rianese f or 
their darker skin' and noted that Indonesian soldiers 
'commonly expropriate agricultural commodities'. The 
report also cites a more spec ific crime noting multiple 
reports from missionaries that upon taking control of West 
Papua from the UN in 1963, Indonesian military personnel 
emptied warehouses of goods belonging to local merchants 
and transported the merchandise and food by Indonesian 
Air Force planes out of the area. The report notes that 
within two months, there was an acute shortage of food and 
consumer goods . Reporting from the Embassy to 
Washington is also replete with accounts of human rights 
abuse by the Indonesian authorities including holding and 
mistreatment of political prisoners, looting conducted 
against the Papuan civil population, and general brutality. 
At the same time, the Embassy also was aware of the 
Indonesian Government's determination to retain control of 
West Papua ('West Irian'). A February 1968 Embassy 
airgram cited 'most observers' as concluding that while 
there was broad Papuan support for independence, 
'Indonesia will not permit a plebiscite which would reach 
such an outcome'. While the US Embassy met regularly 
with Papuans and reported their grievances in classified 
channels to Washington, senior US officials made clear to 
the Papuans that they 'should look to Holland in the first 
instance for insuring the fair implementation of the New 
York Agreement' arguing that while the US brokered the 
agreement, it was not a signatory to it. At the same time, 
Embassy reporting also noted Indonesian efforts to prevent 
Papuans from contacting and seeking redress from the few 
UN officials in the area. 
Warnings deliberately ignored 
The visit of an Embassy official to Papua in early 1968 
provided the U.S. with early warning that the Indonesians 
were plannigg to subvert the 'Act of Free Choice'. An 
extensive report on the visit cited a U.N. official as describ-
ing the 'probable' Indonesian plans as entailing the follow-
ing: 'the Government will divide West Irian into a number of 
areas and select a slate of three to five persons from each 
area; a minority of each area's groups may be chosen on the 
basis of local preference, but the majority will be 
Indonesian or Indonesian controlled; the groups thus 
constituted will convene as a whole and endorse union with 
Indonesia. ' That description largely anticipated the 
subterfuge Jakarta was to conduct some 18 months later. 
Underscoring the necessity of resorting to such fraud, the 
same report notes 'all but one Westerner contacted were 
persistent in the belief that Indonesia could not win an open 
election. ' The Embassy reporting officer concluded that 
'violence is inevitable'. 
The documents make clear that while the US Government, 
through its Embassy in Jakarta, was fully aware of the 
Indonesian intent to subvert the plebiscite, Washington was 
not disposed to do anything to protect the democratic 
integrity of the process. A June 1969 Embassy 'confidential' 
telegram to the State Department stated: 'Considering all 
aspects of (the) situation, mission wholeheartedly endorses 
Department position and guidance .. . USG has nothing to 
gain by interfering in (an) already complex problem and 
thereby disrupting present fruitful relations with GOI 
(Government of Indonesia).' 
The Embassy message to the Department continues, 'we 
should, however, continue in low key to bring to GOI atten-
16 
tion need for credibility in Act of Free Choice for Irianese 
sake and to keep relations with Government of Australia and 
Government of Netherlands on (an) even keel'. A 'secret' 
State Department telegram to the US delegation at the 
United Nations also in June 1969 underscored this US posi-
tion. It instructed the US UN team as follows: 'As you are 
aware, discussion (of) this subject with U Thant (UN 
Secretary General) is for a number of reasons a very delicate 
matter. We do not wish to undercut our noninvolved stance 
and appear to be interfering in what is essentially a matter 
between SYG (Secretary General U Thant) and GOI. We 
wish especially to avoid leaving (the) impression that USG 
(is) pressing the SYG toward firmer position with GOI on 
carrying out "letter and spirit" of the 1962 agreement." 
Kissinger memo urges US to keep distance 
The importance of maintaining a discreet public distance 
from the rigged plebiscite was underscored in a 'secret' 
memo signed by Henry Kissinger, then serving as Director 
of the National Security Council, and addressed to President 
Nixon. The July 18, 1969 document is a briefing paper 
preparing President Nixon for his upcoming visit to Jakarta. 
Kissinger's briefing paper, under the heading of 'Points to 
Avoid', cautions Nixon: 'the West Irian "act of free choice" 
will be underway during your visit. It consists of a series of 
consultations rather than a direct election, which would be 
almost meaningless among the stone age cultures of New 
Guinea'. Kissinger's memo continues: 'there is a UN 
observer on the scene, and we assume that U Thant will go 
along with the Indonesian form of the act of free choice. 
There is, however, a small but active West Papuan indepen-
dence movement, and a variety of groups in Australia and 
the Netherlands which take exception to the Indonesian 
techniques of self-determination. Because the U.S. played 
a mediating role in resolving the Indonesian/Dutch contro-
versy over the future of West Irian, there may be a tendency 
to associate you with the form in which the act of free . 
choice is being conducted. We should avoid any U.S. iden-
tification with this act.' 
In 'talking points' prepared for Nixon's meeting with 
Soeharto, the Kissinger memo advises Nixon that 'we 
believe West Irian will definitely decide to stay with 
Indonesia'. Kissinger advises Nixon not to raise the issue 
but adds that if the Indonesians were to raise it, Nixon 
should say that 'we understand the problems they face in 
West Irian but do not believe it is in our interest or that of 
Indonesia for us to become directly involved.' The U.S. 
willingness to give tacit support to the subterfuge in West 
Papua, which was underway during the visit, is explained in 
part by the Kissinger memo's description of the Soeharto 
regime, whose army, by that time, had succeeded in killing 
hundreds of thousands, possibly half a million political 
enemies. Kissinger's memo said of Soeharto's rule: 'The 
government is under the control of a moderate military man, 
Suharto, who although indecisive by outside standards is 
committed to progress and reform. He has achieved impres-
sive results in his own way in cleaning up the mess left by 
Sukarno.' 
As planning for the a mid-1969 'Act of Free Choice" 
unfolded, the Embassy reported without comment informa-
tion provide by the Indonesian Government that it had 
succeeded in limiting the role of the Secretary General's 
personal representative, Bolivian Ambassador Fernando 
Ortiz-Sans, who, according to the New York Agreement, 
was to assist in administering the plebiscite. The Embassy 
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reported that the Indonesians in New York had managed to 
delay the arrival of the UN official (Bolivian Ambassador 
Ortiz Sans), reduce his staff from 11 to five (his staff even-
tually grew to 16) and ensure that he would be based in 
Jakarta and not in West Irian. A May 1969 airgram from the 
Embassy noted the diminished role of Ortiz-Sans as the 
plebiscite approached: 'the active role he envisaged for (his) 
mission in influencing the GOI has been blunted in recent 
months and his grand plans have been circumscribed and 
his activities limited strictly to observer/advisory function.' 
US aware of death threats 
The Embassy also regularly reported progress of GOI 
plans to preclude any democratic result in the plebiscite. An 
August 1968 telegram from the Ambassador described the 
Indonesian Government as 'working to carry out (the) 1962 
agreement in (a) manner which is meaningful but which at 
the same time will ensure continued Indonesian control of 
West Irian.' A June 1969 Embassy airgram reported without 
comment death threats from the Indonesian military issued 
to any Papuan who did not vote for integration in the 'Act 
of Free Choice.' 
The 'Act of Free Choice' transpired during the summer of 
1969 and followed Jakarta's plan closely. The Indonesians 
selected a total of 1026 Papuans who were assembled at vari-
ous locations and given the option to vote for or against 
Papua's incorporation into Indonesia. (Eventually only 1,022 
participated.) The process, as described in notes from the 
period compiled by a western journalist in Papua and by an 
Indonesian 'observer' sponsored by Jakarta, was transpar-
ently fraudulent. 'Delegates' were encouraged to drink 
excessively by their Jakarta military hosts. Those who indi-
cated any resistance to a pro-Jakarta vote were bluntly threat-
ened. In the end, the vote was unanimous for annexation. 
Indonesia expresses appreciation for US 
influence over UN vofe 
U.S . behind-the-scenes support for Jakarta's fraudulent 
'Act of Free Choice' was most important at the United 
Nations where the General Assembly, in the Fall of 1969, 
was called to accept the exercise. An August 1969 memo 
from the State Department's Director for Indonesia, Paul 
Gardner, to Assistant Secretary Green in advance of a meet-
ing between Ambassador Green and the Indonesian UN 
Ambassador reconfirmed the USG strategy of offering quiet 
diplomatic support to the Indonesians. The memo alerted 
Green that 'the Ambassador might ask for our support in 
preparing smooth UN handling of the act' . It advised: 'You 
might point out that lobbying for certain procedures could 
focus undue attention on the agenda item, stimulating other 
nations to take part. If asked by other delegations for our 
views, however, the U.S. delegation would note that lengthy 
debate could serve no useful purpose.' 
In fact, U.S. support for the Indonesians at the U.N. 
General Assembly ultimately proved to be substantial. A 
November 17, 1969 'memorandum of conversation' 
reported on a discussion between Secretary of State Rogers 
and Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik and their staffs. 
The memo notes that in response to a request from Malik 
that the U.S. 'do what it could to convince the African 
nations of the need for judicious handling of the 'Act of Free 
Choice matter,' Secretary Rogers responded that the U.S. 
'had already been in touch with the delegations mentioned 
by Foreign Minister Malik as well as with others.' Rogers 
added: 'In our general discussions on this matter we have 
taken the position that the 1962 Agreement has been satis-
factorily executed.' The Secretary then offered to contact 
one key African Ambassador personally. 
The importance of the US role in the ultimate UN failure 
to disapprove the fraudulent 'act of free choice' is made 
clear in a December 1969 message from the Indonesian 
mission to the UN to the US mission. The message, signed 
by the Indonesian Mission Chief, states: 'On behalf of the 
Indonesian delegation, permanent mission and staff, let me 
express to you our appreciation for your valuable support 
regarding West Irian, which has helped make possible the 
successful completion of the long struggle of the Indonesian 
people for complete freedom, national unity and territorial 
integrity.' 
Postscript: In what must appear as deja vu for Papuans, the 
U.S. and the international community appear again to be 
conspiring with the Government of Indonesia to subvert the 
civil and political rights of the Papuans. After having 
pressed Papuans to accept Jakarta's offers of 'special auton-
omy' rather than pursue independence, the U.S. and many in 
the international community have reacted in silence as 
Jakarta has reneged on its own special autonomy offer and 
instead, has sought to divide the Province into three parts 
[see separate item]. At the same time, among those 
concerned about justice for the Papuans, there is a growing 
campaign to persuade the United Nations to review its 
acceptance of the fraudulent 1969 'Act of Free Choice' 
[visit also: http://westpapuaaction.buz.org/unreview/]. 
This is an edited version of an article by Edmund 
McWilliams, a retired US senior Foreign Service Officer 
who served as Political Counsellor at the US Embassy in 
Jakarta in the late 1990's 
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Will justice be done at the Priok trials? 
An ad hoc human rights court in Jakarta has started to try suspects involved in the Tanjung Priok 
massacre. All 14 defendants are members of the military and police. It has taken almost two decades 
for this trial to materialise. This is the second ad hoc human rights court following the trials on East 
Tim or. The senior officers at that time, the armed forces Commander-in-Chief General Benny 
Murdani and Jakarta military commander General Try Sutrisno are absent from the list of defendants. 
It took years of efforts before the Tanjung Priok trials 
actually took place. Lack of political will was the main 
reason. Twice the Commission that had the task of investi-
gating the Tanjung Priok massacre (KPP Ham Tanjung 
Priok, Komisi Penyelidik dan Pemeriksa Pelanggaran Hak 
Azasi Manusia di Tanjung Priok) was asked by t~e Attorney 
General's Office to improve their investigation and find-
ings. It was thanks to the persistent work by the human 
rights organisation Kontras, together with Komnas HAM, 
the National Commission of Human Rights and last but not 
least members of the families of the Tanjung Priok victims 
that finally made the trials a reality. 
The Tanjung Priok massacre happened when military and 
police started firing at random on a peaceful demonstration 
of around 5,000 people demanding the release of 4 people 
who were arrested in an earlier bout with the military. 
Allegedly some anti government posters were hanging in a 
mosque and an NCO officer, wearing his army boots, 
stripped the poster from the wall. This incident created 
protests and an angry crowd burned the motor cycle of the 
NCO officer, which resulted in the arrest of the four. 
Kopassus commander on trial 
The most senior active service officer on charge is Major 
General Sriyanto Muntrasan, the present commander of 
Kopassus, the notorious red berets elite troops of the 
Indonesian army. At the time he was serving as a young 
intelligence officer with the rank of captain heading the 
North Jakarta military district operational unit. Under the 
Human Rights Law no. 26/2000, if found guilty the defen-
dants face a minimum of 10 years imprisonment and a 
maximum sentence of death. 
Sriyanto 
who became 
commander 
of Kopassus 
last year has 
denied any 
wrongdoing 
in the Tan-
jung Priok 
case. One of 
the prose-
cutors, 
Darmono, 
told the 
judges at the 
Jakarta 
S . h .1. 1 C e n t r a 1 nyanto, t e sm1 mg genera 0 . . C istnct ourt 
that: ''As an operational officer, the defendant did not stop 
his men from carrying out gross human rights violations". 
According to Darmono, defendant Sriyanto shouted at the 
demonstrators: "Disperse or we will shoot you." 
The 5,000 men strong Kopassus outfit has been involved 
in all the major human rights violations since 1965. Their 
bloody role in East Timor in the nineties and in fanning a 
sectarian war in Maluku is widely known. Kopassus is often 
seen as an outfit outside state control, or even outside the 
control of the armed forces command. 
Some of the other prominent defendants are retired offi-
cers like Major General (ret) Pranowo and Major General 
(ret) Rudolf Butar-Butar. They are accused of having failed 
to prevent the killing spree and the mistreatment of civilians 
during and after the incident. 
Intimidation 
During the sessions of Sriyanto's trial, hundreds of 
Kopassus soldiers in uniform crowded in the courtroom, 
demonstrating their support for their commander. Soldiers 
from other units also arrived in military trucks. At one point 
the soldiers filled the aisles and hallway. Three rows of 
military vehicles were parked in front of the court building. 
Witnesses/survivors of the Priok tragedy and their human 
rights lawyers have called this 'show of force' an act of 
intimidation. Around 20 victims asked the police to protect 
them from the Kopassus soldiers. 
In the session of 11 November two witnesses withdrew 
their written and signed statements in the dossier against 
Major General (ret) Pranowo. Syarifuddin Rambe and 
Ahmad Safi said in their testimonies that they did not suffer 
torture other than 'just casual beatings' during the period of 
detention. Both men now claim that their statements were 
'emotionally-charged' and regret having made them. In an 
earlier session Syarifuddin Rambe made a statement that he 
was tortured during detention. 
In the last two years serious efforts have been made by the 
military to find a way to accommodate the grievances of the 
victims and their families. Former Vice President General 
(ret) Try Sutrisno, at that time army commander of Jakarta, 
created a so called Islamic reconciliation settlement (islah) 
with the community in Tanjung Priok. Some 87 people, 
including Rambe and Safi were signatories of the agree-
ment. It has not been disclosed how much money was 
involved in this arrangement. 
'Forgotten' tragedy 
The Tanjung Priok massacre occurred on 12 September 
1984 at a time when the Suharto government was imposing 
a 'strait jacket' ideology for the entire nation: political 
parties, organisations and individuals. This mono-loyalty 
doctrine met strong resistance in certain Muslim circles and 
the Tanjung Priok massacre became the start of a vicious 
drive against Muslim communities in many parts of Java. 
The Tanjung Priok tragedy never became a major issue in 
Indonesian politics. In the early part of the eighties the 
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Suharto regime was arguably at the peak of his power and 
one of the main features was to impose the state doctrine 
Pancasila down everybody's throat. 
It was generally accepted in human rights circles that 
voices against the Pancasila, mainly from Muslim groups, 
were deliberately fostered but at the same time closely 
monitored. It was a fact of life that certain mosques became 
the rallying point for anti-Pancasila sermons and an incident 
was easily stage-managed. As described above, a soldier, 
allegedly wearing his boots, marched in a mosque in Priok 
and the provocation was born. 
The main Muslim organisations: Muhammadiyah and 
Nahdlatul Ulama kept quiet and failed to raise the issue. It 
was clear that the regime would come down on them also 
heavy-handedly. The curbed Indonesian press could hardly 
report anything. In the following two years hundreds of 
people were arrested, mostly members of small Muslim 
communities. A real witch-hunt started with the Tanjung 
Priok massacre. One year after the tragedy 28 people who 
took part in the demonstration in Tanjung Priok were put on 
trial and received heavy prison sentences. In this atmos-
phere of fear and terror, it was practically impossible to 
bring the issue fo the surface. Only after the fall of Suharto 
in 1998 were the victims of Tanjung Priok able to speak up. 
Number of victims 
Komnas HAM, the National Commission of Human 
Rights conducted an investigation and came to the conclu-
sion that 33 people were killed during the shooting and 
another 555 injured. Families of the victims insist that the 
death toll was around 400. Listening to the accounts of 
some of the survivors the death toll must have been high as 
the troops opened fire at random on the 5,000 protestors 
with the deliberate aim to kill. In the second stage troops 
began to move up the streets hunting survivors and finish-
ing off wounded victims on the streets. 
Ad hoc human rights courts 
Ad hoc human rights courts in Indonesia are new and only 
came became possible after the fall of Suharto in 1998. It 
took another 4 years before the first ad hoc human rights 
court (on East Timor) was established in July 2002. And this 
happened only after strong pressure from the international 
community. 
The overall conclusion of the East Timor ad hoc court is 
that the Indonesian judiciary is not committed to providing 
meaningful justice for the victims of human rights atrocities 
in East Timor. Despite the availability of overwhelming 
evidence that the violence in East Timor was orchestrated 
by the TNI, it became the policy of the prosecution to 
falsely portray the crimes as part of a conflict between two 
violent East Timorese factions which the Indonesian secu-
rity forces failed to control. Another fundamental flaw of 
the ad hoc court on East Timor was the fact that the main 
person responsible, General Wiranto, armed forces 
commander at that time was not named as suspect. The 
present Priok trials became possible because the human 
rights community presented it as a package together with 
the East Timor trials. 
Many similarities can be seen between the two ad hoc 
courts. The main responsible officers, General Murdani, the 
commander-in-chief in those days and General Try 
Sutrisno, the Jakarta military commander were seen by the 
prosecution as innocent. Due course it will become more 
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clear what kind of direction will be used by the prosecution 
to avoid will go. The East Timor showed fundamental flaws 
as the main perpetrators were not indicted. The only posi-
tive outcome was the spotlight given by the press on the 
East Timor tragedy itself. It is more than likely the outcome 
of the Priok trials will be just that. * 
ISLAM DIADILI 
Mengungkap Tragedi Tanjung Priok 
(original title Muslims on Trial, TAPOL Publication 
1987 
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INJUSTICE 
Fresh violence rocks Central Sulawesi 
The periodic violence which has blighted Central Sulawesi since December 1998 erupted again at the 
beginning of October when a series of attacks killed at least 13 people. While the atta~ks have not yet 
set off the feared cycle of revenge attacks and recriminations, they have increased tenswns and under-
mined the fragile peace in the province. 
Exactly a year after the terrorist outrage in Bali, nine 
peopfe were killed and eleven injured following a well-
planned armed attack by masked men in the early morning 
of 12 October on three villages in Central Sulawesi. A tenth 
person was later found dead having been reported missing 
after the attack. The villages - Saatu, Pantangolemba and 
Pinedapa - are in the Pesisir sub-district west of Poso city, 
the centre of regional unrest over the past five years. 
Just two days earlier, three people were killed, five were 
seriously injured and dozens of houses were burned to the 
ground in the Beteleme sub-district of Morowali Regency, 
some 300 km southeast of Poso. 
The targets of both attacks, 
which are believed to be linked, 
were pre-dominantly Christian 
villages. Previously Beteleme 
was largely unaffected by the 
conflict, but may have been 
targeted as the home town of the 
notorious Christian militia leader 
Febianus Tibo, currently on 
death row following his convic-
tion for the murder of Muslims. 
The Indonesian Government 
deployed an additional 8,000 
troops and police to the area. 
Following an intensive hunt for 
the attackers, a joint police and 
military force shot dead six 
suspects in a Morowali forest. 
Around 20 other suspects have 
been arrested and are being held 
in police custody. 
Despite concerns that the 
attacks would unleash a spiral of 
sectarian violence similar to that 
which occurred in and around Poso between 1998 and 2001, 
the feared cycle of revenge killings has so far not materi-
alised. 
The unrest in Central Sulawesi, originally sparked by a 
minor incident between a Protestant and a Muslim youth in 
Poso in December 1998, has claimed over 1,000 lives and 
made tens of thousands homeless. Although on a smaller 
scale than the communal conflict in neighbouring Maluku, it 
has been equally devastating for the communities involved. 
A peace agreement, known as the Malino Declaration, 
signed in December 2001 brought some relief, but occa-
sional incidents of violence have continued to occur. 
Complex causes 
The unrest is often portrayed as a religious conflict 
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between Muslim and Christian groups in and around Poso, 
but the underlying causes are far more complex. Re~i?ion 
has played a part, but so have inter-related poht1cal, 
economic, social and ethnic rivalries and tensions. In 
common with many other recent conflicts in Indonesia, 
these tensions initially fed on the security vacuum created 
by the downfall of the authoritarian Suharto dictatorship in 
May 1998. The fall-out from Indonesia's economic crisis of 
1997 was also a significant factor. 
The conflict has also been used by outside forces, includ-
ing the notorious Laskar Jihad militia, for their own ends. 
I 
' 
Violence in Poso escalating again 
~~~~~~~~~~-
The arrival of several thousand Laskar Jihad forces in the 
middle of 2001 notably increased the intensity of the fight-
ing. There are persistent but unsubstantiated claims that 
international terrorist networks, such as Al Qaeda and its 
alleged regional affiliate, Jema'ah Islamiyah, have taken 
advantage of the instability to set up training camps in the 
area (1). 
The failure of key institutions such as the local and 
national government, the security forces and the courts to 
respond adequately and effectively to the crisis has also 
been key. The police and army have been accused of, at 
worst, providing weapons and training to the rival factions 
and fanning the flames of the conflict to further their own 
economic and political interests and, at best, abject failure in 
their responsibility to enforce law and order and bring the 
perpetrators of violent crimes to justice. According to local 
residents quoted by Human Right Watch: ' ... an effective 
and unbiased depl-0yment of police or military, supported by 
a justice system that could hold the perpetrators individually 
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accountable, could have ended the problem when in began 
in 1998' (2). 
The head of one of the villages attacked on 12 October 
said 'I saw guns like those belonging to security officers 
who were once on duty here' (3). Ammunition made by 
Pindad, the state-owned weapons company which supplies 
the Indonesian military (TNI), has also been reportedly 
found. TNI Commander in Chief, Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, 
denied his men were involved, but threatened his own form 
of retribution if they were: 'If it is subsequently proven that 
soldiers who ought to be securing the area were part of the 
problem, they should be shot in the head,' he warned (4). 
Peace remains fragile 
Several theories have been advanced to explain the cause 
of the recent outbreak of violence but they are still partly 
speculative. 
One theory, reported by the Indonesian weekly journal 
Tempo, and supported by Coordinating Minister for 
People's Welfare, Jusuf Kalla, who brokered the Malino 
Declaration, links the attacks with Jema'ah Islamiyah, the 
shadowy group blamed for the Bali bombing atrocity. 
Some significance has been attached to the fact that the 
attack on Poso occurred on the first anniversary of the Bali 
bombing and several of the Poso suspects killed by the 
police or held in detention originally came from Lamongan, 
East Java the hometown of convicted Bali bombers 
' . Amrozi, Ali Imron and Ali Ghufron, alias Mukhlas. 
According to Tempo, the alleged mastermind behind the 
recent attacks, Muhammadong alias Madong, who was one 
of the six suspects shot dead by the police, was a former 
pupil of Mustofa, an important Jema'ah Islamiyah leader in 
Sulawesi, Maluku and the southern Philippines. 
Poso has long been a strategic location in trade routes link-
ing Malaysia, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Mindanao in the 
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southern Philippines, the home of the Philippines Islamic 
movement, and is now used for the smuggling of weapons 
through this route. The southern Philippines has been iden-
tified as the source of many of the weapons used in the 
recent attacks. 
Prominent activist, George Aditjondro, believes that the 
repeated incidents in which armed groups have provoked 
conflict between the two communities are evidence of a war 
between Indonesian intelligence and local residents (5). 
Others, including the police, are more cautious about the 
involvement of outsiders and blame local polit-
ical rivalries or the renewal of unresolved feuds 
from previous outbursts of violence. One high-
ranking police officer claimed the attacks were 
the work of individuals and had nothing to do 
with Muslim or Christian communities: 'That's 
why religious leaders were not provoked by the 
incidents because they remain committed to the 
Malino Accord,' he said (6). 
Whatever the explanation for the recent attacks 
and notwithstanding the moderation of the 
response, peace in the area remains fragile. 
Many of the root causes of the violence have not 
been addressed properly and provocation from 
outside forces continues to be a possible threat. 
Much work still needs to be done to enforce law 
and order and to build the trust and reconcilia-
tion necessary for the communities of Central 
Sulawesi to enjoy the peace they deserve. 
Notes 
(1). For analyses of the root causes of the 
conflict, see 'Dirty War in Central Sulawesi', 
TAPOL Bulletin No 1641165, p. 17 and 
'Breakdown: Four Years of Communal Violence 
in Central Sulawesi', Human Rights Watch, 
December 2002 
http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/12/indo 1204.htm 
(2) Human Rights Watch, ibid., p. 2. 
(3) 'Govt to impede infiltration of Poso' Jakarta Post, 16 
October 2003. 
(4) 'Waiting for the Next Attack', Tempo, 28 Oct - 3 Nov 
2003. 
(5) 'Poso conflict is a war between intelligence and local 
residents, says observer' Antara, 19 October 2003. 
(6) 'Police nab one more suspect in Marowali case', Jakarta 
Post, 4 November 2003. 
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ACEHIWEST PAPUA 
European Parliament acts on Aceh and Papua 
On October 1, 2003, a hearing on human rights in Papua and Aceh was held at the European 
Parliament (EP) in Brussels, hosted by its Committee on Development and Co-operation. The event 
was also attended by solidarity groups and aetivists. 
The establishment of Martial Law in Aceh on May 19, 
effectively closed the province to all out side attention and 
aid . In Papua, the ongoing instability reflects the govern-
ment's move to divide the province into three. In both 
provinces widespread · human rights abuses continue 
unabated. The situation prompted the European Parliament 
to pass an Urgency Resolution ' . .. on the situation of human 
rights in Indonesia', specifically in Aceh and Papua, adopted 
on June 5, 2003. 
An objective of the committee's hearing was to ensure that 
the Urgency Resolution was followed up. 
Like all EP committees, the Committee on Development 
and Co-operation prepares legislative and non-legislative 
directives and reports. They then come before a plenary 
session, to be passed into 'EU laws' . What makes an 
Urgency Resolution special is that it is a compromise 
between the seven European level party political groups. 
Despite being a non-legisiative resolution when it concerns 
a third country, an Urgency Resolution constitutes a strong 
political signal of the parliament's opinion and will. 
The Acehnese and West Papua representatives invited to 
make contributions where John Rumbiak, executive direc-
tor of the Papua based Indonesian human rights NGO 
ELSHAM (Institute of Human Rights Study and Advocacy) 
and Aguswandi, a board member of the Aceh office of the 
Indonesian human rights NGO KONTRAS (Commission 
for Disappearances and Victims of Violence) and represen-
tative ofTapol. 
Mr Malik Mahmoud from the ASNLF (Acheh-Sumatra 
National Liberation Front) - the political leadership of the 
Free Aceh Movement (GAM) - gave his perspective on the 
Aceh situation. 
The Indonesian Government refused to participate, choos-
ing instead to send a letter of protest to the committee. This 
was regrettable, as a good opportunity was missed for 
Indonesia to explain what non-military solutions it had 
taken regarding Aceh and Papua. 
Both the hearing and the following press conference 
stressed that invitations to have a dialogue do not constitute 
endorsement of any particular views. John Rumbiak 
pointed out that "no matter what, both sides of conflict are 
needed" for a dialogue for peace to take place between 
Jakarta and Papua. His suggestion that human security be 
prioritised over state security was reflected in the 
Rapporteur's reminder that human rights are indivisible. 
The committee's acting chairman MEP Max van den Berg 
(PES, the Netherlands) said in his opening words that it is 
important "for the EU to continue supporting those tolerant 
and moderate developments which help to end violence in 
Papua and Aceh". 
Aguswandi stressed that in Aceh, nobody is winning the 
war - not GAM, not the Indonesian Government, and defin-
itively not the civilian population. The problem won't be 
solved by a couple of peace deal meetings, he s~id, b~c~use 
its root cause is not separatism but the Indonesian military 
(TNI) whose militaristic approach to political problems 
demands that foreign governments put pressure on the TNI. 
GAM reiterated that it was ready to re-open dialogue. 
An important role for the EU . 
John Rumbiak confirmed that there was a defimte role for 
the EU, and that financial and political support from the 
international community was important. The Rapporteur 
said that the EU was already financially engaged as a 
member of the Tokyo Preparatory Conference on Peace and 
Reconstruction in Aceh, along with the World Bank, the US 
and Japan. 
One cannot overestimate the importance of the 1 October 
hearing. The EU does not always follow-up issues of 
concern effectively, but this hearing went beyond the parlia-
ment's usual watchdog role. As well as applying democra-
tic pressure and using its press visibility, it gave political 
support to the commission that initiates and adjusts 
programmes, is charged with their implementation, and 
represents the EU in its foreign relations. 
John Rumbiak drew attention to the EU's political and trade 
relations with Indonesia, referring to EU arms sales to 
Indonesia and environmental destruction in his native 
Papua. He asked: should not the EU's bilateral relations be 
subject to stringent human and other rights conditions? 
EU 'ready to act' 
The MEPs agreed to join the UN Secretary General's call 
to open up Aceh for external aid. The representative of the 
EU Commission confirmed that it was "ready to act" and 
that aid to Aceh needed to resume. One of Aguswandi's 
key contributions was to call for a greater role for civil 
society in conflict resolution and the building of sustainable 
peace. 
The Rapporteur's speech (available in French from Tapol) 
called for "moderate, critical voices to advance peace and 
reconstruction". In reference to Papuans' relations with 
Jakarta, he continued that "[w]e are ready to offer mediation 
to facilitate this dialogue". 
MEP Nelly Maes (EFA president, Flanders) called for a 
parliamentary delegation to visit Papua to study the devel-
opment needs of its population. 
The Urgency Resolution and the hearing constitute a force-
ful political endorsement of urgent action to address human 
rights violations and humanitarian plight in Aceh and Papua 
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US Congress opposes military ties as UK support 
for TNI remains strong 
Efforts by the Bush administration to revive military ties with Indonesia in the name of the 'war against 
terror' hav~ (ounde~ed on s!ro~g Congressional opposition based on concerns about the TNI's lack of 
accountability and its contmumg record of abuse in Aceh, West Papua and elsewhere. But British 
support for the TN/ alarmingly continues to increase. 
Bush 'misspeaks' 
In an embarrassing episode for the White House 
President Bush 'had to be corrected by officials after h~ 
state.d on Indonesi~i;i television ahead of a meeting with 
President Megawatt m Bali on 22 October that he hoped to 
·~o ~o~ard with a l?ackage o~ military-to-military coopera-
tion with Indones.1a followmg a change of attitude by 
Congress. Referrmg to a stumbling block in relations 
betwee°: the two countries, the President said he appreciated 
Ii;id?nes1a's co-opera~ion with the FBI in investigating the 
k1llmg of two Amencans in August 2002 at the Freeport 
copper-and-gold mine in West Papua. The Indonesian 
police and the human rights group ELSHAM say there is 
strong ~vide°:c~ that the killings were perpetrated by 
Indonesian mtl1tary (TNI) personnel [see separate item: 
'Military sets Papua agenda']. 
According to the Washington Post, administration. officials 
offered the unusual explanation that the President 
'misspoke' during the television interview. They said that 
no new programmes are currently planned or have been 
approved. 'Progress in building a broader military-to-mili-
tary relationship ... will be pinned on continued cooperation 
from Indonesia on the investigation into the [Freeport] 
murders,' they said ['Officials Correct Bush on Indonesia' 
Washington Post, 20 October 2003]. ' 
The President was wrong in stating that Congress has 
changed its attitude. In fact, both Houses strongly oppose 
renewed military ties because of the TNI's human rights 
record and its suspected involvement in the Freeport 
killings. 
Congress bans IMET 
In July, the House of Representatives voted unanimously 
to stop the administration spending $600,000 in 2004 on 
programme known as International Military Education and 
Training (IMET), which brings foreign military officers to 
the US for training, until the President certifies that 
Indonesia is co-operating fully with the Freeport investiga-
tion. The Senate also agreed unanimously to ban IMET in 
a vote on 28 October. Both the House and Senate measures 
continue the ban on foreign military financing for 
Indonesia. 
Congress did originally approve $400,000 for IMET in 
2003, but Indonesia's participation was ultimately restricted 
to a more limited programme, known as Extended IMET. 
In May 2003, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
unanimously approved reinstating the ban on IMET for 
Indonesia. 
in the violent destruction of East Timor in 1999. 
There is now mounting opposition to the administration's 
efforts to resume military co-operation. On 17 October, 
Congressman Lane Evans wrote· to colleagues urging them 
to oppose the President's call to renew ties. The resumption 
of co-operation, without any conditions requiring the TNI to 
improve its human rights record 'essentially rewards the 
TNI for its own terrorism, including the past abuses in East 
Timor, the current assault on civilians in Aceh, and numer-
ous other human rights violations,' he argued. 
Ed Mc Williams, a former State Department official who 
served as political counsellor in the US Embassy in Jakarta 
from 1996-1999 insisted that strengthening ties would do 
nothing to improve the TNI's human rights record: 'For over 
three decades, the US and Indonesian militaries were 
extremely close and we saw no move to reform. The 
Indonesian military's worst abuses took place when we 
were most engaged' [East Timar Action Network (ETAN) 
press release, 21 October 2003] . 
Activists and grassroots organisations in the US have 
played a vital role in raising Congressional awareness of the 
dangers of renewed ties. Patsy Spier, a survivor of the 
Freeport attack, which killed her husband Rick, has been a 
powerful advocate against re-engagement. 
Activists are now pressing Congress to agree further 
conditions on the resumption of IMET in addition to those 
relating to the Freeport investigation. Previous conditions 
including accountability for rights violations in East Timo;, 
have never been met. They are also calling for an end to 
counter-terrorism training, which currently involves train-
continued on back page 
Congress first voted to restrict IMET in response to the 
1991 Santa Cruz massacre in East Timor. All military ties~~~!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!~~!f......:::::.:....._:_ _ __::~:::..:::: J 
with Indonesia were suspended following TNI involvement Scorpion tank in Aceh 
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ing, arming and funding, with an initial $16 million, a 
special unit of the Indonesian police [see ETAN press 
release, 29 October 2003 and 'US Trains Indonesian Elite 
Unit To Fight Terrorism', Far Eastern Economic Review, 6 
November 2003]. 
UK Parliament powerless to stop British 
support for TNI 
Unlike their US counterparts, members of parliament 
(MPs) in Britain have been able to do little to stop British 
support for the TNI. They appear powerless to prevent the 
Government ignoring the TNl's use of Hawk jets and 
Scorpion tanks in its bloody war in Aceh despite the fact 
that Indonesia is in flagrant breach of 'assurances' that it will 
not use British equipment for offensive or counter-insur-
gency purposes [see 'Hawk jets used in Aceh war', TAPOL 
Bulletin No 171/172, p. 24] . 
It has recently come to light that to accommodate 
Indonesia's requirements, the British Government, in 
August 2002, quietly agreed to a substantial relaxation of 
the Indonesian 'assurances' to allow the deployment of 
equipment to Aceh when previously that was not permitted. 
Apart from expressing their concern, there is little that MPs 
I 
can do about this or about the continuing sale to Indonesia 
of spare parts for the Hawks, Scorpions and other equip-
ment. 
The power of the arms industry lobby enables it to dictate 
policy to the extent that the Government is more concerned 
about maintaining the arms trade and its strategic partner-
ship with the TNI than about human rights. An official 
report published in July disclosed that in 2002, the 
Government authorised a staggering 20-fold increase in the 
value of arms sales to Jakarta, from £2 million in 2000 to 
£41 million in 2002. 
The equipment licensed for export in 2002 included poten-
tially lethal aircraft cannons and components or associated 
equipment for aircraft cannons, armoured fighting vehicles, 
armoured personnel carriers, tanks, combat aircraft, and 
combat helicopters. 
Despite these setbacks, UK campaigners will continue to 
press home the message that TNI is a source of terror and 
insecurity for Indonesia and that engagement with it on a 
business-as-usual basis is wholly misguided and dangerous. 
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